Countering Infiltration and Going Global

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)¹ operates as a party driven by ideological rule, where the formulation and implementation of policies are deeply tied to its underlying ideological framework. Any ideological disagreement with the CCP is often perceived as a threat, particularly when it involves organized groups, such as religious communities, whose beliefs inherently challenge the party’s ideology. As a result, it is crucial to identify ideologies that may pose a threat to the security of Chinese socialism and address them with appropriate seriousness.

中共^[1]是一個意識形態治國的政黨，任何政策的制定和執行，均與其背後的意識形態前提有關，而且，任何與其意識形態有所分歧的，都視為與之敵對的，特別是那些有組織型態的，如宗教團體，其思想作用均帶有意識形態鬥爭的意義在內。因此，有必要認清什麼樣的意識形態對中國社會主義的安全是構成威脅的，即是要認真予以對待。 

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the CCP initiated a series of purges aimed at “imperialism,” with both Catholicism and Protestant Christianity targeted as perceived tools of imperialist invasion, a concept widely referred to as “cultural invasion.” In recent years, the approach to religious affairs has shifted toward the “Sinicization of Christianity.” This strategy is rooted in two key objectives: “countering infiltration” and “going global.” The former aims to prevent Christianity from being used as a tool for foreign influence, as proposed by Duan Dezhi (段德智) of Wuhan University. The latter focuses on enabling Chinese Christianity to extend its influence globally, a vision advocated by Xu Yihua (徐以驊) of Fudan University.

中華人民共和國成立後，中共就展開一系列對「帝國主義」的清算，不論是天主教或是基督教，一概視為要清理的對象，因為他們都是帝國主義侵略中國的工具，俗稱「文化侵略」。到了當代，在宗教事務的處理和態度上，轉而高呼「基督教中國化」，其背後依賴著支撐著這一個方向的戰略思考，即是「防滲透」與「走出去」。更清晰的表達是，為防止基督教成了滲透的工具，以及如何使中國基督教可以走出去，影響他人。前者是由武漢大學段德智提出，後者則是復旦大學徐以驊所提出的倡議。 

While leading a major research project on philosophy and social sciences for the Ministry of Education of the PRC, titled “A Strategic Study on Religious Infiltration from Abroad and China’s Ideological Security” (境外宗教滲透與我國意識形態安全戰略研究), Duan Dezhi outlined three key aspects of national strategic thinking: preventing and resisting foreign religious infiltration, safeguarding the ideological security of socialism, and opposing ethnic separatism. He regards this as a fundamental issue tied to the survival or demise of socialist ideology.

在主持中華人民共和國教育部哲學社會科學研究重大課題項目「境外宗教滲透與我國意識形態安全戰略研究」時，段德智提供了三方面的國家戰略思考：防範和抵制境外宗教滲透、維護社會主義意識形態安全、反對民族分裂主義。在他認為，這是一個關乎社會主義意識形態存廢的元問題。

The roots of this issue can be traced back to the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, which prompted renewed reflection on the need to address the potential collusion between religion and foreign forces, and the threat this poses to the security of China’s socialist ideological rule. As a result, stricter measures were deemed necessary to limit the connections between domestic religious groups and foreign influences.

這個問題的起源或借鏡，與蘇東變劇有著密切的關係。1989年蘇東劇變所帶來新一波的反思，即是要更加強對宗教與境外勢力勾結問題的關注，以及這個問題對中國的社會主義意識形態的統治構成安全性的威脅，因而必須更加限制國內宗教團體與境外勢力的聯繫。 

Duan Dezhi emphasized that religion is a significant national security concern for three main reasons: (1) religions are inherently organized, (2) their ideologies often compete with state ideologies, and (3) they frequently maintain transnational connections. These factors have compelled the CCP to closely monitor the influence of foreign or transnational religions in China. On the international stage, transnational religions often leverage their global networks to influence domestic governance, sometimes leading to social conflicts or contradictions and, in more extreme cases, triggering so-called “color revolutions.” As a result, it is imperative to guard against the impact of religion on national governance and ideology, with particular vigilance to avoid a recurrence, in China, of the “Eastern European tragedy” of the last century.

段德智指出，宗教是國家安全的一項重大課題，一是宗教是有組識的，二是它們的意識形態是具競爭性，三是它們往往具有跨國的關係性作為聯繫。這三個因素都是構成了中共要緊釘著境外或跨國的宗教對中國所產生的影響。在國際上，跨國宗教經常以此跨國的力量構成對本國治理的影響，小致引起社會衝突或矛盾，大致則會誘發所謂的「顏色革命」，因此宗教不能不防範其對國家統治及其意識形態的衝擊，小心類似於上個世紀的東歐劇變在中國上演。 

Duan Dezhi argued that foreign religious infiltration played a significant role in the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European parties. He argued that the Soviet Union’s failure to adapt religion to socialist society was a fundamental error, stemming from both “left” and “right” missteps. Stalin’s “ultra-left” approach of violently opposing religion produced counterproductive effects, while Gorbachev’s “ultra-right” approach of promoting religious work led to alienation from the Party and socialism. Duan emphasized that both extremes were detrimental and that the crux of the issue lies in the proper implementation of religious policies. For this reason, he reiterated that this is a fundamental issue tied to the survival of socialist ideology.

段德智認為，蘇聯以及東歐其黨的垮台，主要即是境外宗教滲透的後果。他指出，蘇聯宗教工作的根本失誤在於它並沒有從根本上解決好宗教與社會主義社會相適應的問題，即是「左」的也是「右」的錯誤，從斯大林的「極左」地粗暴反宗教造成反效果，到戈爾巴喬夫的「極右」推動宗教工作變成對黨和社會主義離心。所以說，「右」誤國，「左」也誤國，關鍵就在於如何恰如其分地執行宗教政策。這也就是為何他特別要重申，這是一個關乎社會主義意識形態存廢的元問題。 

In essence, given the current significant shifts in the international landscape, China’s “religious work” must remain vigilant to the reality that religion is often perceived as a “foreign force.” The issue of “infiltration” should be carefully considered in all aspects of this work, as religion is perceived as a force that threatens China’s regime or national unity. Particular caution is advised when addressing Vatican Catholicism and US-based Christianity, which are regarded as having been “leveraging foreign forces for influence.”

總之，面對當前國際情勢的重大變化，中國執行「宗教工作」時，應牢記著宗教作為一股「境外勢力」是必須高度警覺地，所有的工作都應當考慮到存在「滲透」的問題，也就是說，宗教是一股威脅中國政權或分裂中國疆域的勢力，特別是「挾洋自重」的（梵蒂岡）天主教和（美國）基督教更應小心翼翼地對待。 

Xu Yihua, the director of the Center for the Studies on Religion and China’s National Security at Fudan University, advocates for the “Religious Diplomacy Theory,” which explains China’s religious development and its national security concerns from a diplomatic perspective. He proposes the concept of “going global,” which involves active diplomatic negotiation or counter-offensive strategies. Xu contends that transnational religions undermine patriotic sentiment by creating confusion over national identity and are often used as a legitimate basis for international criticism or intervention, such as in the case of human rights issues like freedom of religion. He views these issues as tools used by foreign powers to exert pressure on China.

徐以驊是上海高校智庫復旦大學宗教與中國國家安全研究中心主任，他的「宗教外交論」或中國宗教「走出去」的主要論點，是從外交的角度來解釋中國的宗教發展與國家安全的問題，提出所謂「走出去」的主動出撃式的外交交涉或反攻為旨。徐認為，跨國性宗教是會制造國家認同混淆，對愛國主義的行為不利，並且，國際較力中宗教經常成了談判或批評的正當性理由，以作為合法去干預他國的內政，如宗教自由人權問題成了向中國施壓的藉口。 

As religion is closely linked to China’s status as a global power, it is crucial to shape China’s international image and solidify its diplomatic influence. The strategy of making Chinese religions “go global” is part of China’s broader approach to diplomacy and international relations. This can be achieved by engaging with multinational religious groups and organizations through state channels (i.e., legal religions), rather than through civil society (i.e., illegal or underground religious groups). The “going global” of Chinese religions aims to promote them globally, serving two purposes: first, to demonstrate to the international community that religious freedom exists within the Chinese state, with religions under Chinese governance exhibiting unique characteristics; and second, to leverage these religions as a tool to project China’s diplomatic power and enhance its soft power, encapsulated in the concept of “the Believing China (信仰中國).”²

由於宗教問題與中國大國的形象有關，所以必須從國際關係方面著手來打造國家形象和鞏固國際地位，如何使中國宗教「走出去」是作為中國外交或國際關係中一種戰略，其方法即是通過國家(合法宗教)而非民間(非法，地下)的方式與跨國宗教團體和組織的交流與往來。中國宗教「走出去」即是把中國宗教推向世界，一方面向國際社會展示依中國國情下仍存在著宗教自由的，而且這樣在中國政府治理下的宗教有其自身的特色，並且通過了這些宗教來展現中國的外交勢力—「信仰中國」^[2]。作為信仰大國的中國，其在宗教上的軟實力是可以多加發揮或使用的。 

Xu emphasized that China is now a “major country” with its own strategies and unique perspective, positioning itself as a “major country of faith.” He highlighted the critical role of religion as a vehicle for China’s public diplomacy, reflecting the government’s central role in facilitating public diplomacy and people-to-people exchanges. According to China’s national context, this approach integrates government and citizen participation in parallel, fostering multilevel interactions. It represents the flexible application of the Party’s united front theory and mass line principles on an international scale.

徐以驊指出，中國現在是一個「大國」，「大國」自有大國的戰略和思維，而且，中國在宗教上是一個「信仰大國」。宗教作為一個中國的公共外交之載體，即是由中國的國情決定政府在公共外交和民間交流中的關鍵作用，其做法即是：「官民並行，多層互動的公共外交和民間交流正是黨的統一戰線和群眾路線理論在國際層面的靈活應用。」 

As a country abundant in religious resources, China can leverage religion as a form of soft power in its diplomacy by promoting Chinese religions aligned with its policies and practices. The church, academia, and government can serve as the core pillars of religious public diplomacy, establishing a division of labor among the religious, academic, and political sectors. This collaboration aims to strengthen China’s influence in global diplomacy, embodying the vision of “Chinese religion going global.”

作為一個宗教資源豐富的大國，宗教可以作為中國外交的軟實力，輸出中國政策和實踐下的中國宗教，教會學界和政府三界可以構成中國宗教公共外交的主體，形成宗教界躬行踐履、學術界建言獻策、政界統籌協調的基本分工，以體現中國大國外交的實力。這即是「中國宗教走出去」的主張。 

Xu believes that China’s large population of religious believers serves as clear evidence of the country’s steady religious development. Combined with China’s significant international influence, this population provides an opportunity to export a uniquely Chinese form of religion to the world. By doing so, China can not only demonstrate the stability of its religious development but also introduce religions with Chinese characteristics, particularly Christianity adapted to Chinese characteristics. Xu argues that as the international community gains a better understanding of Christianity in China, criticism of the country’s approach to managing religious development will diminish.

徐以驊認為，以中國龐大信仰的人口，足以向世界證明中國宗教發展一直都是良好的，再者，當中國龐大的信仰人口加上國際地位的影響，中國可以向世界輸出她自己的宗教形態，這樣就不僅可以向世界證明中國宗教的穩定發展，也向世界介紹中國特色的宗教，尤其是中國特色的基督教，只要國際上多認識中國基督教，也就自然少了對中國在管治宗教發展上的指責。 

Building on Tu Weiming’s (杜維明) concept of “Cultural China,” Xu Yihua introduced the idea of “the Believing China” as part of China’s international diplomatic strategy and cross-strait policy, presenting it as an “unspoken safeguard for national security.” Xu argues that “the Believing China” is not merely a contemporary strategy but is deeply rooted in historical precedent. He notes that throughout China’s history, periods of national strength and self-confidence have often coincided with significant religious exchanges between China and foreign countries. On one hand, this reflects China’s active acceptance and tolerance of both local and foreign religious beliefs, fostering harmonious coexistence. On the other hand, it demonstrates China’s sincere efforts to learn from and disseminate exemplary religious cultures from abroad. Through these frequent and constructive religious interactions, China not only shapes its own identity but also influences neighboring countries. This approach ensures that China’s diplomacy is rooted in strong mutual relationships, including positive connections with the religious traditions of other nations.

仿效杜維明提出的「文化中國」的概念，「信仰中國」則是徐以驊提出作為國際外交和兩岸統一的概念，具有一種他稱之為「中國國家安全的隱性防線」。徐以驊特別指出，「信仰中國」不僅是一種當下的現實論述，更有其深厚的歷史基礎。從長時段的視角來看，但凡中國處於國力強盛、民族自信的歷史時期，都出現了中外宗教交流大發展的盛況。一方面，它意味著中國積極接納、包容各種本土與外來的宗教信仰，使之在中國和合共生；另一方面，它表現為中國真誠地向域外（海外）學習或傳播優秀的宗教文化，通過所謂的頻繁而良性的宗教互動，不僅塑造了中國自身，也同時塑造了中國的周邊世界，進而確保中國與外國的外交在彼此宗教的良好關係中。 

In summary, the strategy of “Chinese religion going global” or exporting “the Believing China” represents an adjustment in China’s approach to national security and religious issues following the end of the Cold War in 1989. This strategy aims to position religion as a tool for promoting national economic development, safeguarding national interests, advancing the values of a harmonious society, propagating socialist ethics, and strengthening national security. It also seeks to expand religion’s role to encompass both social and diplomatic functions. In this sense, the “Sinicization of Christianity” becomes a critical component of China’s foreign strategy. It is not only about adapting Christianity to align with Chinese characteristics domestically but also about developing a distinctly “Chinese Christianity” capable of “going global” and representing the nation on the global stage.

總之，「中國宗教走出去」或輸出「信仰中國」的戰略是1989年以來，即冷戰結束後中國國家安全與宗教問題所做的調整，它的積極性作用是使宗教可以進一步地促進國家經濟建設、維護國家利益、實踐和諧社會價值和宣傳社會主義倫理、保障國家安全，得使宗教承擔起社會功能以致於外交功能。「基督教中國化」在此意義下，更是國家對外戰略中一個重要的環結，換言之，它就不是僅僅只對國內而言的「中國化」，而是要展示出「走出去」的「中國基督教」。 

Editor’s note: This article was originally written in Chinese and was translated and edited by the ChinaSource team with the author’s permission and approval.

1. Editor’s note: Both CPC and CCP refer to the Communist Party of China. The term CPC is the officially recognized designation within China, while some foreign media continue to use CCP.
2. Editor’s note: About the definition of “The Believing China (信仰中國)”, see Xu Yihua 徐以驊 and Liang Yancheng 梁燕城,〈中國全球戰略與精神文明〉[China’s Global Strategy and Spiritual Civilization],《文化中國》[Cultural China], no. 87 (2015): 4-14, accessed March 11, 2025, https://crrs.org/w/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/87-p04-XuLeung.pdf. While Xu and Leung originally coined the English term “the Believing China,” “Religious China” may be more intuitive for English-speaking readers.