How Zhongguohua Was Adopted as a Path in China’s Current Religious Policy

In 2015, General Secretary Xi Jinping (習近平) proclaimed “adherence to the direction of Zhongguohua (中國化, Sinicization) of religions”¹ in religious policy. Although the term Zhongguohua was new in his policy, its roots stretch back further, with various uses throughout Chinese history. For instance, the concept of Zhongguohua of Marxism can be traced to Mao Zedong (毛澤東).² This article explores the prehistory of Zhongguohua of Protestant Christianity as propagated by the Xi administration, which is outlined below. While in my wider research, I argue that Zhongguohua has a specific prehistory in every context within which Xi applies it, I also contend that, as a political slogan, its exact meaning remains ill-defined and has to be spelled out in relation to current and future religious debates.

Xi speaks of the Zhongguohua of all five recognized religions, with Protestant Christianity being one of them, alongside Catholicism, Buddhism, Taoism and Islam. Religious work, for Xi, is part of the Party’s broader agenda. It takes place under the banner of socialist religions, under which each religion is confronted with the question of what adapting to China means for them. The Zhongguohua of Protestant Christianity is often discussed under the label of Jidujiao Zhongguohua (基督教中國化, Sinicization of Christianity) or Jiduzongjiao zhongguohua (基督宗教中國化, Sinicization of Christian religion). Scholars such as Tang Xiaofeng (唐曉峰) use the latter term to encompass both Protestantism and Catholicism, despite the two being treated as distinct religions within Chinese discourse.³

The Zhongguohua of Christianity has roots in academic discussions, which have gradually influenced Xi’s religious policy. Understanding how academic debates have influenced policy requires recognizing the interplay between academia and politics in China’s Marxist education system, where scholars frequently act as political advisors.⁴

With China’s opening at the end of the 1970s, the religious landscape and its research flourished. An important organization in this development is the Institute of World Religions (IWR) (Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan shijie zongjiao yanjiu suo, 中國社會科學院世界宗教研究所), which was founded in its current form in 1981. It is part of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) (Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, 中國社會科學院), and its predecessor was already established under Mao.⁵ The aim in the 1960s was to understand religion as a fundamental aspect that influences the global population.⁶ Today, the research of the IWR is focused on analyzing religions from a global perspective. CASS is one of the leading research institutions in China, specializing in the social sciences.⁷ It was founded in 1977 and reports directly to the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. Its main task is to conduct social science research, provide policy advice, and offer scientific expertise in various areas of the social sciences. The Academy plays a significant role in shaping China’s social and economic policies by providing important scientific studies and recommendations to the government. CASS is also an important hub for the production of academic publications dealing with Chinese society, politics, and the economy. At the IWR, atheists and scholars of various religions conduct research side by side. Moderate atheists at the institute had believed that religion would naturally fade as China’s economy prospered.⁸ However, tensions arose between militant atheists and scholars of religious studies, especially after the change of power from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping. However, it was only after the change of power that both sides sensed an opportunity to gain more influence.⁹ As early as 1998, Zhuo Xinping (卓新平) became the first scholar of Christian studies to serve as the director of the IWR, which gave Christian Studies a major boost in legitimacy with support from other pioneering scholars such as Liu Xiaofeng (劉小楓) and He Guanghu (何光滬).¹⁰ However, Christian Studies came under increased pressure in the early 2010s from some atheists who accused the field of undermining Marxist ideology.¹¹

In response to these pressures, Zhuo Xinping, together with Zhang Zhigang (張志剛), two scholars of religion, proposed framing the Zhongguohua of Christianity as a way to consolidate various discourses on how Christianity could adapt to China.¹² This refers to various aspects , including contemporary political dimensions, as well as the cultural and religious spheres. Discussions about adaptation had been present since the first missionaries entered China in the seventh century CE and could be described under the slogan Zhongguohua. Previously, related discussions had often taken place under terms such as indigenization (bensehua, 本色化), localization (bentuhua, 本土化), and contextualization (chujinghua, 處境化) and were primarily related to cultural and religious concerns. The discourse on the Zhongguohua of Marxism, which was viewed positively by Party theorists, may have served as a model here, as well as the Zhongguohua debate of Buddhism, which demonstrably led to an increase in publications and was of great interest to the Communist Party of China (CPC).¹³ The debate was on how Buddhism, originally from India, transformed into an integral part of Chinese culture; in a broader sense, the central question is how religions can be integrated into the Chinese system with a Marxist view of religion.¹⁴ In a similar vein, one can interpret Zhang Zhigang and Zhuo Xinping’s proposal of the Zhongguohua of Christianity as a way to defend Christian Studies against criticism from atheists. The discourse was well-received by both academics and officials from the State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA).

Despite the claim that the Zhongguohua promoted by Xi originates in academia and has been integrated into religious policy, it would be inaccurate to suggest that this policy operates separately from religious groups and that the line of Zhongguohua is only imposed on them. Politics and religion in China are not only intertwined through academic structures. Discourses are also shaped by the religious organizations themselves. Regarding Protestant Christianity, a brief look at the past of the two umbrella organizations of the Protestant church in China, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) (Zhongguo jidujiao sanzi aiguo yundong weiyuanhui, 中國基督教三自愛國運動委員會) and the China Christian Council (CCC) (Zhongguo jidujiao xiehui, 中國基督教協會) is necessary. The two organizations were founded at different times but exist in parallel today and are referred to under the term liang hui (兩會, “the two organizations”). They have a joint headquarters in Shanghai, are often publicly perceived as a unit due to their joint appearance, and are referred to as the official Protestant Church. But they are separate in terms of their organizational structure, each with its own president and administrative regulation. Legally speaking, the Three-Self Movement is above the Christian Council. The movement emerged in the context of the political and ideological changes in China after the founding of the PRC. During this period, the government adopted a policy emphasizing adaptation to Chinese conditions and promoting an anti-imperialist approach, including in matters of religion. Similarly, some Christians took the Chinese revolution as an opportunity to rethink the church and come to terms with the CPC.¹⁵ It was against this background that the TSPM was founded in 1954 under the leadership of Wu Yaozong (吳耀宗) and other leading Christian and political figures. From the very beginning, the TSPM had to cooperate with the CPC.¹⁶ The name “Three-Self” refers to the three principles emphasized by the movement: self-governance, self-financing and self-propagation, which are still its guiding principles today.¹⁷ The authors of the founding document, the Christian Manifesto (三自宣言 san zi xuanyan, full name: 中國基督教在新中國建設中努力的途徑, Zhongguo jidujiao zai xin Zhongguo jianshe zhong nuli de tujing), argue that Christianity must adapt to the new communist reality in China.¹⁸ Their aim is to establish an indigenized Chinese church. The Three-Self ideas date back to the missionary strategists Henry Venn and Rufus Anderson.¹⁹ In a way, the debate harks back to earlier discussions about the adaptation and independence of Christianity in China. The narrative has always been about adapting Christianity to the actual circumstances. This narrative is still used today. Proponents point to the early discussions of indigenization, contextualization and localization as precursors to today’s discussion. For example, Zhang Zhigang argues that the previously mentioned terms were primarily used by scholars from the church side to discuss the adaptation of Christianity in relation to culture and social circumstances. In contrast, Zhongguohua is now widely used in academic discourse as a term that addresses that addresses the integration into “Chinese culture, the Chinese nation, and in particular, contemporary Chinese society.”²⁰ The difference between then and now lies not in the question of adaptation but in the circumstances to which Christianity should adapt. Today, this is the ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

In conclusion, Xi’s directive to align all religions with Zhongguohua is not only rooted in academic and institutional history but is also deeply embedded in the traditions of the official Protestant Church. This history illustrates the complexity of defining what exactly Zhongguohua means. Xi’s policy, while framed as a duty for religions to adapt to a socialist society, remains vague in terms of its concrete content and its broader implications for religious practice in China.

1. Xi Jinping習近平, 〈鞏固發展最廣泛的愛國統一戰線 為實現中國夢提供廣泛力量支持〉 [Consolidate and Develop the Broadest Patriotic United Front to Provide Broad Support for the Realization of the Chinese Dream], 中央政府門戶網站[Central Government Portal], May 20, 2015, accessed January 20, 2025, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-05/20/content_2865448.htm.
2. Mao Zedong 毛澤東, 《第一編-關於世界觀和方法論》 [Part One – On Worldview and Methodology], accessed January 20, 2025, https://www.marxists.org/chinese/pdf/chinese_marxists/mao/01210805.pdf, 204.
3. See Tang Xiaofeng 唐曉峰, 〈基督宗教研究的中國化發展及其宗教學定位〉 [The Development of the Sinicization of the Study of Christian Religion and ist Religious Orientation], 《中國宗教》 [China Religion], No. 8 (2018).
4. Zhuo Xinping卓新平, 〈士的擔當與宗教學的未來〉 [The Responsibility of the “Scholar” and the Future of Religious Studies], 天主教在線 [Catholic Online], April 9, 2018, accessed January 21, 2025, https://ccccn.org/other/2018-04-09/63022.html.
5. Wu Yungui, “The History of the Institute of World Religions Chinese Academy of Social Sciences”, Conference paper, in The Historical Significance of the Lotus Sutra and its Role in the 21st Century, ed. by Soka University. Institute of Oriental Philosophy, Japan and Institute (2014), accessed January 21, 2025, https://www.totetu.org/assets/media/paper/j010_005.pdf, 6.
6. Wu, “The History of the Institute of World Religions Chinese Academy of Social Sciences”, 6.
7. CASS, 〈中國社會科學院概況〉[Overview of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences], 中國社會科學院 [Chinese Academy of Social Sciences], accessed January 22, 2025, http://www.cass.cn/gaikuang/.
8. Yang Fenggang 楊鳳崗, “Sinicization or Chinafication? Cultural Assimilation vs. Political Domestication of Christianity in China and Beyond”, in The Sinicization of Chinese Religions: From Above and Below, ed. Richard Madsen (Leiden: Brill, 2021), 24f.
9. Ibid., 29.
10. Ibid., 28.
11. Ibid., 29.
12. See Zhang Zhigang, “Three-fold Thinking on the Sinicization of Christianity”, Evangelische Theologie 75, no. 5 (2015), 385f.
13. Yang, “Sinicization or Chinafication?”, 29f.
14. Fang Litian方立天, 〈論中國化馬克思主義宗教觀〉 [On the Religious View of Marxism with Chinese Characteristics], 《愛思想》 [Aisixiang], December 9, 2022, accessed January 22, 2025, https://www.aisixiang.com/data/138975.html.
15. Philip L. Wickeri, Seeking the Common Ground: Protestant Christianity, the Three-Self Movement, and China’s United Front (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2011), 42.
16. Wickeri, Seeking the Common Ground, 42.
17. Xu Xiaohong 徐曉鴻, 〈發揮三自組織在新徵程中的引領作用 系統推進我國基督教中國化——慶祝中國基督教三自愛國運動委員會成立70週年講話〉 [Play the Leading Role of the Three-Self Movement in the New Journey, and Systematically Promote the Sinicization of Christianity in China — Speech Celebrating the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the China Christian Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee], 中國基督教三自愛國運動委員會 \ 中國基督教協會 [China Christian Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee \ China Christian Council], October 24, 2024, accessed January 21, 2025, https://www.ccctspm.org/cppccinfo/18358.
18. Ibid.
19. Wickeri, Seeking the Common Ground, 37.
20. Zhang, “Three-fold Thinking on the Sinicization of Christianity”, 385f.