The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)1 operates as a party driven by ideological rule, where the formulation and implementation of policies are deeply tied to its underlying ideological framework. Any ideological disagreement with the CCP is often perceived as a threat, particularly when it involves organized groups, such as religious communities, whose beliefs inherently challenge the party’s ideology. As a result, it is crucial to identify ideologies that may pose a threat to the security of Chinese socialism and address them with appropriate seriousness.
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the CCP initiated a series of purges aimed at “imperialism,” with both Catholicism and Protestant Christianity targeted as perceived tools of imperialist invasion, a concept widely referred to as “cultural invasion.” In recent years, the approach to religious affairs has shifted toward the “Sinicization of Christianity.” This strategy is rooted in two key objectives: “countering infiltration” and “going global.” The former aims to prevent Christianity from being used as a tool for foreign influence, as proposed by Duan Dezhi (段德智) of Wuhan University. The latter focuses on enabling Chinese Christianity to extend its influence globally, a vision advocated by Xu Yihua (徐以驊) of Fudan University.
While leading a major research project on philosophy and social sciences for the Ministry of Education of the PRC, titled “A Strategic Study on Religious Infiltration from Abroad and China’s Ideological Security” (境外宗教滲透與我國意識形態安全戰略研究), Duan Dezhi outlined three key aspects of national strategic thinking: preventing and resisting foreign religious infiltration, safeguarding the ideological security of socialism, and opposing ethnic separatism. He regards this as a fundamental issue tied to the survival or demise of socialist ideology.
The roots of this issue can be traced back to the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, which prompted renewed reflection on the need to address the potential collusion between religion and foreign forces, and the threat this poses to the security of China’s socialist ideological rule. As a result, stricter measures were deemed necessary to limit the connections between domestic religious groups and foreign influences.
Duan Dezhi emphasized that religion is a significant national security concern for three main reasons: (1) religions are inherently organized, (2) their ideologies often compete with state ideologies, and (3) they frequently maintain transnational connections. These factors have compelled the CCP to closely monitor the influence of foreign or transnational religions in China. On the international stage, transnational religions often leverage their global networks to influence domestic governance, sometimes leading to social conflicts or contradictions and, in more extreme cases, triggering so-called “color revolutions.” As a result, it is imperative to guard against the impact of religion on national governance and ideology, with particular vigilance to avoid a recurrence, in China, of the “Eastern European tragedy” of the last century.
Duan Dezhi argued that foreign religious infiltration played a significant role in the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European parties. He argued that the Soviet Union’s failure to adapt religion to socialist society was a fundamental error, stemming from both “left” and “right” missteps. Stalin’s “ultra-left” approach of violently opposing religion produced counterproductive effects, while Gorbachev’s “ultra-right” approach of promoting religious work led to alienation from the Party and socialism. Duan emphasized that both extremes were detrimental and that the crux of the issue lies in the proper implementation of religious policies. For this reason, he reiterated that this is a fundamental issue tied to the survival of socialist ideology.
In essence, given the current significant shifts in the international landscape, China’s “religious work” must remain vigilant to the reality that religion is often perceived as a “foreign force.” The issue of “infiltration” should be carefully considered in all aspects of this work, as religion is perceived as a force that threatens China’s regime or national unity. Particular caution is advised when addressing Vatican Catholicism and US-based Christianity, which are regarded as having been “leveraging foreign forces for influence.”
Xu Yihua, the director of the Center for the Studies on Religion and China’s National Security at Fudan University, advocates for the “Religious Diplomacy Theory,” which explains China’s religious development and its national security concerns from a diplomatic perspective. He proposes the concept of “going global,” which involves active diplomatic negotiation or counter-offensive strategies. Xu contends that transnational religions undermine patriotic sentiment by creating confusion over national identity and are often used as a legitimate basis for international criticism or intervention, such as in the case of human rights issues like freedom of religion. He views these issues as tools used by foreign powers to exert pressure on China.
As religion is closely linked to China’s status as a global power, it is crucial to shape China’s international image and solidify its diplomatic influence. The strategy of making Chinese religions “go global” is part of China’s broader approach to diplomacy and international relations. This can be achieved by engaging with multinational religious groups and organizations through state channels (i.e., legal religions), rather than through civil society (i.e., illegal or underground religious groups). The “going global” of Chinese religions aims to promote them globally, serving two purposes: first, to demonstrate to the international community that religious freedom exists within the Chinese state, with religions under Chinese governance exhibiting unique characteristics; and second, to leverage these religions as a tool to project China’s diplomatic power and enhance its soft power, encapsulated in the concept of “the Believing China (信仰中國).”2
Xu emphasized that China is now a “major country” with its own strategies and unique perspective, positioning itself as a “major country of faith.” He highlighted the critical role of religion as a vehicle for China’s public diplomacy, reflecting the government’s central role in facilitating public diplomacy and people-to-people exchanges. According to China’s national context, this approach integrates government and citizen participation in parallel, fostering multilevel interactions. It represents the flexible application of the Party’s united front theory and mass line principles on an international scale.
As a country abundant in religious resources, China can leverage religion as a form of soft power in its diplomacy by promoting Chinese religions aligned with its policies and practices. The church, academia, and government can serve as the core pillars of religious public diplomacy, establishing a division of labor among the religious, academic, and political sectors. This collaboration aims to strengthen China’s influence in global diplomacy, embodying the vision of “Chinese religion going global.”
Xu believes that China’s large population of religious believers serves as clear evidence of the country’s steady religious development. Combined with China’s significant international influence, this population provides an opportunity to export a uniquely Chinese form of religion to the world. By doing so, China can not only demonstrate the stability of its religious development but also introduce religions with Chinese characteristics, particularly Christianity adapted to Chinese characteristics. Xu argues that as the international community gains a better understanding of Christianity in China, criticism of the country’s approach to managing religious development will diminish.
Building on Tu Weiming’s (杜維明) concept of “Cultural China,” Xu Yihua introduced the idea of “the Believing China” as part of China’s international diplomatic strategy and cross-strait policy, presenting it as an “unspoken safeguard for national security.” Xu argues that “the Believing China” is not merely a contemporary strategy but is deeply rooted in historical precedent. He notes that throughout China’s history, periods of national strength and self-confidence have often coincided with significant religious exchanges between China and foreign countries. On one hand, this reflects China’s active acceptance and tolerance of both local and foreign religious beliefs, fostering harmonious coexistence. On the other hand, it demonstrates China’s sincere efforts to learn from and disseminate exemplary religious cultures from abroad. Through these frequent and constructive religious interactions, China not only shapes its own identity but also influences neighboring countries. This approach ensures that China’s diplomacy is rooted in strong mutual relationships, including positive connections with the religious traditions of other nations.
In summary, the strategy of “Chinese religion going global” or exporting “the Believing China” represents an adjustment in China’s approach to national security and religious issues following the end of the Cold War in 1989. This strategy aims to position religion as a tool for promoting national economic development, safeguarding national interests, advancing the values of a harmonious society, propagating socialist ethics, and strengthening national security. It also seeks to expand religion’s role to encompass both social and diplomatic functions. In this sense, the “Sinicization of Christianity” becomes a critical component of China’s foreign strategy. It is not only about adapting Christianity to align with Chinese characteristics domestically but also about developing a distinctly “Chinese Christianity” capable of “going global” and representing the nation on the global stage.
Editor’s note: This article was originally written in Chinese and was translated and edited by the ChinaSource team with the author’s permission and approval.
Endnotes
- Editor’s note: Both CPC and CCP refer to the Communist Party of China. The term CPC is the officially recognized designation within China, while some foreign media continue to use CCP.
- Editor’s note: About the definition of “The Believing China (信仰中國)”, see Xu Yihua 徐以驊 and Liang Yancheng 梁燕城,〈中國全球戰略與精神文明〉[China’s Global Strategy and Spiritual Civilization],《文化中國》[Cultural China], no. 87 (2015): 4-14, accessed March 11, 2025, https://crrs.org/w/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/87-p04-XuLeung.pdf. While Xu and Leung originally coined the English term “the Believing China,” “Religious China” may be more intuitive for English-speaking readers.
Chin Ken Pa
Prof. Dr. Chin Ken Pa, Department of Philosophy, Fu Jen Catholic University, Taiwan. Professor Chin’s areas of research include Critical Theory, Post-modernism, Western theology in the 20th century, and Sino-theology. His teaching courses include the history of Western philosophy, philosophy of religion, and the political theology of Carl Schmitt. He …View Full Bio